"to weaken the circle of particularism"
For my money, though I love the conviviality of Goldberg, and the literary essays of Derbyshire, the writer at National Review who best combines deep and impressive research with theoretical imagination and clarity of expression is Stanley Kurtz. This is not to say I have understood in toto his every column, but any lack of understanding has been due only to my lack of time or energy to address his writings, some of which require background in the subject he’s addressing in order thoroughly to comprehend them. I don’t quite have the historical knowledge to fully appreciate his latest, so this entry is more aimed at posing questions than giving answers to or opinions on some of the things he says.
Kurtz has written a so-called book review at the Weekly Standard, of Philip Carl Salzman’s Culture and Conflict in the Middle East. I say “so-called” not to denigrate or challenge him, but because it is so much more than a book review (pasted into Microsoft Word, in 12-point Times New Roman, it reaches 13 pages). The review encompasses an obscure (to me) allusion to Native American history, a mini-history of the discipline of anthropology, a summation of the book’s argument, and an analysis of our own time in light of the issues raised in the book (these last three elements apparently come from both Salzman and Kurtz, in which proportion he does not make clear).
At the end of an argument that, in essence, the Arab tribal nature of our enemies is more responsible for our (and their) troubles than is their Islamic nature (though it’s not that simple, so go read the essay, and then, perhaps, the book), Kurtz writes,
This example also brings up the American Indians. There I have fewer questions, though based still on a somewhat thin instruction in the subject. It seems clear that the American approach to “the gap” was both similar to and different from the British approach. The British gave over India to a private company – the British East India Company – to manage. That company essentially provided its own protection, until at some point they got too brutal and were essentially fired by the British government, who then took over the colony, finally releasing it after World War II. (Please don’t rely on this history, though, yourself – look it up if you have any doubts, because I wouldn’t bet my blog income on it being flawless.) The Americans also gave over the business of gap shrinkage to private actors – thousands and thousands of them, individual colonists or pioneers setting out on their own to find freedom and profit. But these individuals were not required to protect themselves, as the American Army was sent out in their behalf (thus becoming complicit in their injustices, as well as committing a few of its own). When enough of these individuals lived in an area pacified by the military, they would petition to become part of the United States, thus transforming the paradigm.
The Subcontinental solution, it seems, was primarily political – a transformation of Indian culture – though there may have been genocidal elements I don’t know of. In the American West, the solution was partly genocidal – though that was partially inadvertent and not truly comparable to the classic genocide perpetrated by the Nazis. It was also partially political, as some Indians became assimilated to the invaders. And it was something in-between – perhaps a form of ethnic cleansing – in which the gap was shrunk into a multitude of gaps we today call reservations. (It seems that the reservations are still somewhat gappish, if the horror stories I hear occur within them are true.) Iraq, finally, is an almost wholly government-run effort, almost entirely political in nature, with its temporarily colonized natives being – as often as they are willing – partners in the efforts of the U. S. military. It is not ethnic cleansing, because they are not being moved to make way for the invaders. It is not genocidal, because they are not being exterminated. (Indeed, one reason I supported the invasion of Iraq was because I preferred the certain travails of nation-building to the potential crime of nuclear genocide of an entire region – ask yourself what might have happened after four to five more 9/11’s, and you’ll perhaps see my point.)
I still have lots of questions, enough that I’m not entirely confident in what tentative analysis I do offer above. If I had to take a guess of where I’d find my answers, my dilettantish historical reading and poor memory suggest Henri Pirenne and Christopher Dawson may make good choices, though I certainly have no particular works in mind – the only one I know by the former is on the rise of the cities, and I’ve only read a few essays by the latter. Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror might be useful, though her main examination of lawlessness covers the mercenary companies of the 1300’s, which seemed to grow out of settled agrarian populations – perhaps that is an example of the Khalduno-Gellneric patterns of tribal alignment and causality that Kurtz mentions. Rather than pondering on any more, however, I’ll take my leave. Perhaps Mr. Kurtz can suggest a reading list for those of us who wish to know more – after we get finished with Salzman, that is.
Kurtz has written a so-called book review at the Weekly Standard, of Philip Carl Salzman’s Culture and Conflict in the Middle East. I say “so-called” not to denigrate or challenge him, but because it is so much more than a book review (pasted into Microsoft Word, in 12-point Times New Roman, it reaches 13 pages). The review encompasses an obscure (to me) allusion to Native American history, a mini-history of the discipline of anthropology, a summation of the book’s argument, and an analysis of our own time in light of the issues raised in the book (these last three elements apparently come from both Salzman and Kurtz, in which proportion he does not make clear).
At the end of an argument that, in essence, the Arab tribal nature of our enemies is more responsible for our (and their) troubles than is their Islamic nature (though it’s not that simple, so go read the essay, and then, perhaps, the book), Kurtz writes,
It won't be easy to weaken the circle of particularism – the self-reinforcing loyalties of extended family, tribe, and sect that dominate Arab countries at both the state and local levels. The British did something comparable in traditional India by creating a counter-system of liberal education and advancement through merit, rather than kin ties. But that took time, military control, and a favorable political environment. The road to genuine cultural change is long, and there are no easy shortcuts.This seems profoundly sensible. It’s an admission of the benefits of empire, analogous to Jonah Goldberg’s advice to re-colonize Africa, or Thomas Barnett’s admonition to “shrink the gap.” But it gets me to wondering, in a chicken-egg kind of way: What did Europe do to escape tribalism? Was it the Romans and then the Church that set up meritocracies (army and clergy, respectively) analogous to the political one grown over the years in British India? Or was it faith in gods or God – a thing in which to believe other than earthly power? Do the Greeks get any credit, even though their democracies didn’t outlast their own strife? Why weren’t their democracies inherently tribal – or were they?
This example also brings up the American Indians. There I have fewer questions, though based still on a somewhat thin instruction in the subject. It seems clear that the American approach to “the gap” was both similar to and different from the British approach. The British gave over India to a private company – the British East India Company – to manage. That company essentially provided its own protection, until at some point they got too brutal and were essentially fired by the British government, who then took over the colony, finally releasing it after World War II. (Please don’t rely on this history, though, yourself – look it up if you have any doubts, because I wouldn’t bet my blog income on it being flawless.) The Americans also gave over the business of gap shrinkage to private actors – thousands and thousands of them, individual colonists or pioneers setting out on their own to find freedom and profit. But these individuals were not required to protect themselves, as the American Army was sent out in their behalf (thus becoming complicit in their injustices, as well as committing a few of its own). When enough of these individuals lived in an area pacified by the military, they would petition to become part of the United States, thus transforming the paradigm.
The Subcontinental solution, it seems, was primarily political – a transformation of Indian culture – though there may have been genocidal elements I don’t know of. In the American West, the solution was partly genocidal – though that was partially inadvertent and not truly comparable to the classic genocide perpetrated by the Nazis. It was also partially political, as some Indians became assimilated to the invaders. And it was something in-between – perhaps a form of ethnic cleansing – in which the gap was shrunk into a multitude of gaps we today call reservations. (It seems that the reservations are still somewhat gappish, if the horror stories I hear occur within them are true.) Iraq, finally, is an almost wholly government-run effort, almost entirely political in nature, with its temporarily colonized natives being – as often as they are willing – partners in the efforts of the U. S. military. It is not ethnic cleansing, because they are not being moved to make way for the invaders. It is not genocidal, because they are not being exterminated. (Indeed, one reason I supported the invasion of Iraq was because I preferred the certain travails of nation-building to the potential crime of nuclear genocide of an entire region – ask yourself what might have happened after four to five more 9/11’s, and you’ll perhaps see my point.)
I still have lots of questions, enough that I’m not entirely confident in what tentative analysis I do offer above. If I had to take a guess of where I’d find my answers, my dilettantish historical reading and poor memory suggest Henri Pirenne and Christopher Dawson may make good choices, though I certainly have no particular works in mind – the only one I know by the former is on the rise of the cities, and I’ve only read a few essays by the latter. Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror might be useful, though her main examination of lawlessness covers the mercenary companies of the 1300’s, which seemed to grow out of settled agrarian populations – perhaps that is an example of the Khalduno-Gellneric patterns of tribal alignment and causality that Kurtz mentions. Rather than pondering on any more, however, I’ll take my leave. Perhaps Mr. Kurtz can suggest a reading list for those of us who wish to know more – after we get finished with Salzman, that is.
Labels: anthropology, colonialism, imperialism, iraq, Islam, Middle East, Stanley Kurtz, Thomas Barnett
posted by J. R. R. Hawking | 11:42 PM
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