Publius J. Goldberg

I read a bit earlier tonight from Jonah Goldberg's blog, Liberal Fascism, which is named after his book, (which, like many books, I own but have not yet read). In a post titled, “Their Community Building -- And Ours (Or, Why I'm More Libertarian),” he says that modern liberalism, having essentially totalitarian elements, wishes to impose a single way of doing things on the nation as a whole. An example is FDR, who sought to reverse the Great Depression and then the depredations of the Axis. Quoting one William Schambra, Goldberg says, “‘Roosevelt sought to pull America together in the face of its divisions by an appeal to national duty, discipline, and brotherhood; he aimed to restore the sense of local community, at the national level.’” But this “cannot be done,” he claims. He does not explicitly say in his post why this is so, but perhaps his conclusion is simply the fruit of observation – seeing the obviously stronger bond between people who can connect in one place. This bond is stronger simply because it happens naturally – it does not need to be engineered. It results in “the Burkean little platoons of civil society ... local communities, churches, associations, whatever.” This kind of community, according to Goldberg, “is diverse, local, particular, quirky, organic and grown from the bottom up.” “You can have,” he says, “something like a national culture, but the idea of a national community makes me very nervous,” perhaps because of the unnaturalness of Roosevelt’s effort, and the modern liberal effort generally, and the level of coercion that would be necessary to fully implement it.

It is of course these “quirky, organic and grown from the bottom up” communities that are the source and the bane of tyranny. Every human and therefore every would-be tyrant comes out of a locality that has formed him and his ideas. Every would-be tyrant needs a base of support, and his most natural and loyal support likely comes from this locality (Saddam Hussein, with his base of support in Tikrit, north of Baghdad, is an example; Austrian Adolf Hitler’s rise in Germany may well be a counter-example to this, and I suppose the systemic dictators of the Roman Empire or the Soviet Union have advantages that may well have rendered such local bases unnecessary). But the most effective opposition to, or structural hedge against, tyranny will come from local organizations too. This insight is made at least as far back as Federalist Paper number 10, in which Madison argues not only for a Republic, but for a large Republic. He has no hope in small democracies, which he defines as “a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person,” because the majority, being homogenous over a great multitude of issues, will usually rule, which will put the minority at their mercy. Madison says it more exactly:

The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.

The result is “spectacles of turbulence and contention,” and short lifespans for the small democracies. A large republic, simply by virtue of covering great distances, will incorporate all the varied particulars that climate, geography, and distance inculcate and permit in human beings. As Madison puts it,

Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.

He also mentions that distrust – fear of the Other (i.e., the guy you don’t know ’cause he lives so far away) – can have a crippling effect on political organization. The result is that while coal miners in West Virginia and dockworkers in San Francisco may agree on labor issues, they may not agree on environmental issues, for instance. A large republic has not one, but many majorities, all overlapping and needing to compromise to get even part of what they want. Yes, we all feel the good that is lost when what we know is right is not implemented, but we do not miss the tyranny that also goes unimplemented, and the Founders certainly trusted themselves and their fellow citizens enough to believe that self-interest at least would tip the balance in their favor.

The point? That Goldberg is right to support the Burkean platoons of Federalism, since by frustrating the goals of leadership they create the right to lead. Too much leadership by one results in none for others, and as we have no philosopher kings handy (nor should we want one, says Goldberg’s confrere, the Derb), that’s for the best.